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Abstract: The aim of this paper is to consider the topic of pricing decisions in the context of intermodal
transport as a subject of significant influence on intermodality’s success and the move towards
environment friendly modes to bring about a European sustainable transport system. We review the
state of research in intermodal pricing from an Operational Research (OR) perspective as a subject
with a vital link to energy consumption and sustainability assessment. In particular, we study freight
transport within a revenue-maximizing perspective. Driven by the political incentives to enhance its
challenged market position, we direct our discussion to the particular gap in optimization approaches
that tackle service prices as explicit tactical decisions from the carriers’ point of view. A suggestion to
utilize the bilevel programming framework in the present context is put forward, as well as an account
of its widely successful application to similar hierarchical decision schemes. Different approaches to
express the shippers’ behaviour—the potential intermodal transport customers—within the lower
level problem are proposed, along with the modelling implications of different possible objectives as
well as the multimodal network structures.
Keywords: intermodal transport; sustainable freight transport; pricing problems; bilevel programming
1. Introduction
The transport sector—currently dominated by road transport—is considered as a significant
contributor to energy and climate policy as its related emissions continue not to exhibit the same
decline as those in other sectors, such as industry and power generation. Even though, following
a continuous increase, transport emissions have reduced as of 2007 as a result of changed policies
and the universal economic situation, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions from transport, excluding
international maritime, represented about 23% of the total emissions in 2014, compared to 15%
in 1990 and 20% in 2000 [1]. In terms of energy consumption, transport is the highest sector
in this respect in the EU-28 and the second in Belgium with 31.7% and 28% of the final energy
consumption in 2012, respectively [2]. Therefore, the need arises to shift towards more sustainable
and energy-efficient forms of transport systems. In this context, the European Commission defined
the notion of intermodality as a characteristic of a transport system, which allows at least two different modes
to be used in an integrated manner in a door-to-door transport chain [3]. In the freight transport context,
intermodality is commonly considered with the interpretation of a multimodal chain of transport
services that links an initial shipper with the final consignee of the shipment, where the transfer between
modes takes place at designated terminals/hubs without handling the goods themselves [4]. Generally,
environment-friendly modes of transport, such as rail or inland waterways (IWWs), are being used
for most of the travelled route, known as the main haulage, and road for the shortest possible parts,
to and from the origin and destination terminals, respectively, known as the pre- and post-haulage or
drayage operations.
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Recently, in the interest of reducing air pollution and alleviating congestion that are approaching
intolerable levels, intermodality has drawn a wide interest in the scientific and political community
to achieve a better integration of the different transport modes. It is a settled debate by now that
intermodal freight transport is a sustainable and ecological alternative in most cases [5,6]. Furthermore,
when broadly adopted, it provides significant opportunities to generate economies of scale through
freight consolidation and higher load factors [6,7]. These two previous reasons have hitherto fuelled
a wide interest to enhance the position of intermodal transport in the EU market, being greatly in
line with the roadmap set by the European Commission’s White Paper [8] to shift 30% of road freight
over 300 km to less environmentally harmful modes, such as rail or waterborne transport, by 2030,
and more than 50% by 2050. However, Bouchery and Fransoo [9] showed that maximizing the modal
shift does not lead to the minimum level of carbon emissions and that there is a carbon optimal level
of modal shift. This result is in line with [10,11]. The authors proposed to include an environmental
cost to the problem of optimally designing an intermodal network. The optimization problem is
solved by bilevel programming, where the upper level searches for the optimal terminal network
configurations, while the lower level performs multi-commodity flow assignment over a multimodal
network. They showed in an example that the optimal layout of the network is sensitive to the carbon
price. Pan et al. [12] also investigated how freight consolidation and intermodal transportation can
help in curbing carbon emissions. To help close the gap between freight transport network design
and its impact on the environment, especially on climate change, Mostert et al. [13] proposed a
bi-objective model to evaluate the balance between economic (operational costs) and environmental
(CO2 emissions) objectives, in the framework of a network with three modes: road, intermodal rail,
and intermodal inland waterway transport.
Nevertheless, the above goals remain highly ambitious as intermodal freight transport has so
far failed to attract the desired flow levels on most European corridors when compared with its main
competitor: all-road transport that is still in the lead with a large margin, as shown in the latest modal
split figures by the European Commission [14]. This suggests, among other things, the existence of a
room for improving the decision making at the intermodal carriers’ side to be able to offer services
with competitive qualities that could be regarded as a potential alternative to road transport at the
shippers’ side.
The interleaved operations involved in the intermodal transport chains, as well as the complex
interactions between the different actors and stakeholders triggered several interesting research topics
in OR [15,16]. Network pricing, in particular, has been considered as an especially powerful tool to
divert flows between the different paths and modes. Environmentally speaking, the long-established
field of congestion pricing has been advocated as an efficient way to improve social welfare through
studying road link tolls [17] with recent applications to multi-modal networks. Environmental
improvements of this nature also make sense with economical value [18]. Indeed, the competitiveness
of intermodal freight transport was found to be greatly sensitive to the determination of the right
service tariffs, known as the pricing strategy [19]. Pricing strategies are generally distinguishable in
the way they handle the interplay between efficiency and competitiveness. A service price has to
be high enough to cover its costs and generate a profit, and low enough to remain attractive to the
target customers. Striking such a balance can be a complicated process demanding an accurate costs
estimation and a clear insight of the market situation. In that respect, the context of intermodal transport
imposes additional factors to account for as opposed to the single-mode transport, e.g., the modes’
characteristics and their interaction along the transport chain with respect to the representation of the
network and their relative costs to the overall door-to-door level, as well as the difficulty of depicting
the target customers’ behaviour towards the chosen pricing decisions having more than a single
transport scheme to compare against. In addition to the difficulty of estimating the real incurred cost
components along the transport chain (i.e., haulage, terminals and management costs), there is often a
lot of interdependencies that do not make them immediately additive [20].
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Despite being identified as both a significant and highly probable weakness in the face of
developing intermodal transport as desirable freight transport services and, hence, promoting a
shift towards more environmental and sustainable forms of freight transport schemes [21], this class
of decision problems has peculiarly received little attention among researchers [19]. To the best of
our knowledge, no OR framework has been introduced addressing intermodal freight service pricing,
from a medium-term perspective, without making restrictive assumptions, as we explain below (e.g.,
simplifying shippers’ reaction, small theoretical cases, simplification assumption on paths’ structure,
etc.). This paves the way for new modelling issues that are relevant for the intermodal context, yet
have not been thoughtfully discussed.
Furthermore, in the rise of deregulation, the burden of answering pricing questions directly falls
upon carriers and transport service providers. Nowadays, beside the extreme variability in pricing
practices across corridors and market segments, intermodal operators essentially make their service
pricing decisions based on cost assessment, bearing in mind a certain profit margin to attain. Beside the
already challenged market position as exhibited by the recent modal split, this suggests a considerable
room for improvement in terms of reaching high load factors of the transport services. Generally
speaking, energy consumption—a vital criteriion for assessing the performance of a system in terms of
sustainability—is highly dependent on the load factor [2]. The lack of transparency often hindered
previous studies to provide meaningful insights on the actual pricing mechanisms in intermodal
transport. For instance, the RECORDIT project (Real Cost Reduction of Door-to-door Intermodal
Transport) relied on gathered empirical evidence on some parts of the European transportation network
to improve the competitiveness of intermodal transport through the reduction of cost and price barriers,
while respecting the principle of sustainable mobility [20].
We aim through this paper to address this gap in the literature by providing a theoretical study
justifying the utilization of a fairly suitable mathematical framework with applicable characteristics
to the intermodal context, namely: bilevel programming. Theoretically speaking, bilevel programming
provides a complementary approach to the classic estimation of demand functions, thus eliminating the
need to make simplification assumptions on the shipment sizes and the vehicle capacities. Moreover,
in the context of a pricing problem, the tariff function in this methodology is not bound to a specific
analytical form. Indeed, this represents a mathematical advantage and flexibility of the methodology.
The scope of this work is two fold. First, the current state of research in pricing problems is reviewed
for freight intermodal transport, in terms of the notable studies and how they differ with respect to
certain decision and methodological elements. Second, we provide modelling insights on how to
depict the different components of a typical intermodal carrier’s pricing problem within a bilevel
program: a framework though proven adequate for similar hierarchical and non-cooperative schemes,
is still scarcely used in intermodal transport decision support systems.
The paper is organized as follows: we start by examining previous intermodal pricing-related
approaches for the freight sector in Section 2. Section 3 covers the main applications of bilevel
optimization in both the general transport and the pricing context, including the previous bilevel
attempts applied to intermodal networks. In Section 4, we span the different aspects of applying
bilevel optimization to intermodal freight pricing, mainly in what concerns the lower-level problem
potentially expressing the service purchasers’ behaviour, as well as the specific questions that arise
when modelling networks incorporating modality change. Our discussion is finally concluded in
Section 5.
2. Pricing Literature in Intermodal Freight Transport
Intermodal pricing questions are often considered at the tactical level of the decision horizon.
Nevertheless, we notice that a relatively new line of research is currently gaining momentum while
adopting a more detailed viewpoint of the pricing problem in the intermodal transport context.
In most cases, it touches upon operational and Revenue (or Yield) Management (RM) aspects. A widely
accepted definition of yield management is the one of Kimes [22]: a method which can help a firm sell
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the right inventory unit to the right type of customer, at the right time, and for the right price. For the latter,
RM can be divided into four sub-problems: demand forecasting, overbooking, capacity allocation
and pricing. Moreover, industries for which RM techniques are suitable share these characteristics:
(1) relatively fixed capacity; (2) demand can be segmented; (3) perishable inventory; (4) product sold
in advance; (5) fluctuating demand substantially; and (6) low marginal sales costs/high marginal
capacity change costs. These traits are also valid for intermodal transport services. Pricing is a key
component of the RM. If fixed costs are large relative to variable costs, the price of a service cannot be
determined based on its cost, but it will be based on demand. Indeed, the more the demand increases,
the more the fixed costs can be broken down. Market segmentation allows offering services at different
prices to customers’ classes. For a given price, capacity allocation includes determining the number of
units of products or services offered at this price.
Traditionally, two parallel lines of research can be noted with regard to pricing road transport
networks as described by the review of Tsekeris and Voß [23]: (1) pricing of congested urban networks
in such a way as to reflect the societal marginal cost and the externalities created by road travellers
in their private average cost; and (2) pricing highways with the objective of maximizing the profit
of the private road authorities. The first principle lays down the basis of the congestion pricing
field, whereas the second is closely entwined with the movements of privatization and deregulation.
As far as intermodal transport is concerned, the pricing literature may be similarly divided in the
above manner with congestion pricing chiefly studied in passenger transport (e.g., [24–26]), and
profit maximization pricing in the freight sector. As we focus on the freight sector, the latter category
provides the context of our following updated account on the state of the intermodal pricing literature.
We first start by dividing our discussion according to the covered distances by the transport chains.
Afterwards, we elaborate on the most common scheme in intermodal freight transport and the main
scope of the remainder of this paper, i.e., corridors along medium to long distances. The approaches
belonging to this latter category are further classified according to their decision level. Finally, we shed
light on some cost-related decisions and the relevance of the pricing topic in general to a sustainable
transport’s perspective.
2.1. Short Distances
Several City Logistics measures have been implemented to alleviate the negative environmental
impacts from urban freight transport. Cargo bikes, for instance, are considered as alternative forms
of delivery transport as discussed in [27], together with the logistical implications resulting from the
characteristics of this kind of delivering system. Parcel lockers are similarly regarded as an efficient
last mile delivery system in recent years [28]. In the context of pricing as studied in this paper,
Urban Consolidation Centre (UCC) is one of the initiatives to make City Logistics more economically,
environmentally and socially sustainable. According to Browne et al. [29], an UCC denotes a logistics
facility that is situated in relatively close proximity to a geographic area that it serves, from which
goods that are dropped off by logistics companies are sorted, consolidated and finally delivered to their
destinations within that area, often using environmentally friendly vehicles. In other words, UCCs can
be viewed as intermodal platforms or freight villages with enhanced functionality to provide coordinated and
efficient freight movements within the urban zone [30].
Despite their environmental advantages and their potential role in alleviating urban traffic
problems, UCCs are typically associated with high set up (and sometimes operational) costs,
which makes a case for the necessity of a funding scheme relying on initial subsidies from local
authorities for a business continuation [31], unless in distinctive cases of private initiatives [32].
In this context, the question of pricing principally lies in the decision of the UCC operator on the
fee of his/her offered services. The UCC concept is currently challenged in this respect; transport
operators are hardly convinced by the additional cost of the UCC to outsource inefficient last mile
deliveries [32]. A realistic service price has to recover the costs, include the traffic and societal
benefits—conversely, the environmental costs—associated with UCCs at the total supply chain
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level [29], as well as properly reflect the financial benefits, such as the flexibility in planning and
the time reduction [33]. This becomes even more complicated to quantify in the case of UCCs serving
all or part of an urban area, since the parties involved tend to be unequally sharing the financial costs
and benefits, as noted by Triantafyllou et al. [34] in their analysis of a case study in the UK retail sector.
It has been underlined that, until recently, most of the available literature on urban freight distribution
exists of companies and governmental reports [33], articulating the need for more scientific advices.
Nevertheless, subsequent studies to date have been primarily occupied with evaluating existing UCCs
by the means of different cost-benefit assessment methodologies. For instance, Kin et al. [32] showed
that the UCC in Antwerp—one of the most congested cities in Europe—has a positive impact upon
the society and the environment. It enhances city logistics in the designated area regarding pollutants
emitted, congestion, noise, safety and infrastructure. Nevertheless, a thorough investigation of the
pricing mechanisms merits a deeper look.
2.2. Medium to Long Distances
Bontekoning et al. [19] identified two levels at which an intermodal freight pricing strategy
operates; the level of the individual actor in the intermodal chain and the door-to-door level. First, at the
individual actor level, to devise his own strategy, each actor must be aware of his own market position
and the cost structure of the other actors. Previous studies belonging to this class are mainly concerned
with calculating opportunity costs and providing educated pricing guidelines, mostly done from the
perspective of the network (mainhaul) and the drayage operators as addressed in [35,36], respectively.
More recently, Wiegmans and Behdani [37] studied the cost structure of intermodal rail terminals,
specifically with respect to the handling costs and the size of the terminals. Second, at the whole
door-to-door level, pricing decisions are taken for the complete intermodal shipping service, while
accounting for the target customers’ choice and the service options they are typically presented with.
Studies belonging to the latter category—the interest of the rest of this paper—should devise their
methodologies in light of the actual market competition prices and with the aim of breaking even and
attaining an acceptable profit margin, with respect to the incurred costs throughout the logistics chain
(i.e., transport modes’ operating and transshipment costs).
In the following, we intend to present an updated account of the state of literature precisely
tackling the question of charging intermodal freight services, while discerning between the decision
levels and key modelling components. It is worth mentioning though that several previous studies
indirectly dealt with service pricing questions by addressing decision factors that influence the
intermodal market position and its promotion, mostly as simulated parameters within wider decision
support systems. LAMBIT [38], a Geographic Information Systems (GIS)-based location analysis model,
make ex-ante and ex-post analysis of policy measures in Belgium to stimulate intermodal transport,
e.g., price scenarios and subsidies. The LAMBIT is further developed in [39] to account for the question
of fuel price increase and visualize their impact on the market area. Santos et al. [40] discuss the
impact of three different transport policies: subsidizing intermodal transport operations, internalizing
external costs and adopting a system perspective when optimizing the location of inland intermodal
terminals for the Belgian case. A further elaboration on decision support studies for intermodal
transport is available through [15]. More recently, Mostert et al. [41] analyzed the impact on flows
of the introduction of an additional tax on the road network. Their analysis takes its sources in the
recent introduction of the Viapass tax on highways and denser roads by the Belgian public authorities
(April 2016). The Viapass tax is a kilometre-based charge for trucks only. Different kilometric tax rates
are applied based on the weight and EURO norm of the vehicle. However, the studies that consider
intermodal pricing as the main research question are peculiarly less in quantity and depth. Basically,
pricing decisions fall into two levels: tactical and operational levels, depending on the decision’s
frequency and the time frame during which a decision has an impact. We, therefore, follow this same
classification in our review.
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2.2.1. Tactical Level
To the best of our knowledge, very few examples in the literature can be mentioned where
the prices of intermodal services are tackled as decision variables through a mathematical program.
Tsai et al. [42] considered the problem of finding an optimal price for intermodal service in competition
with the all-road truck service. Two competition market models are introduced. On the supply
(carriers) side, it is assumed that the market is shared between a single, profit-maximizing intermodal
service provider and several highly-competitive trucking companies, all charging the same fixed prices.
On the demand (shippers) side, two mode choice methods are defined for each of the presented models.
For the first model, the minimum logistics costs principle is used, stating that, in a certain demand
situation, all shippers will choose the mode with lower logistics costs. The second model depicts
the shippers’ mode choice behaviour through a logit demand function, in terms of the intermodal
and truck service differences. The model is represented as a Stackelberg game, where the intermodal
company is the market leader and the truck companies are the followers who respond to its pricing
initiatives. The conclusions underline the importance of developing more efficient solution approaches,
as well as investigating the theoretical and empirical aspects of the extended network model to consider
larger and realistic cases.
Wang [43] presented a framework that is initially motivated to assist in a Port Authority’s
investment decisions, in the frame of an intermodal freight network. The author illustrated the
interaction, as well as the mutual decision impact between three levels of players: the Port Authority,
carriers (terminal operators) and shippers. In a first step, a carriers’ (oligopolistic) market is considered,
in terms of their pricing and routing decisions, where their equilibrium follows a Nash equilibrium.
In a second step, the interaction between the carriers and the shippers is cast into a Stackelberg game,
formulated as a bilevel programming problem. A heuristic algorithm, based on a sensitivity-analysis
method, is developed for the problem. In a final step, the bilevel approach is evoked once again to
evaluate the impact of several investment strategies of the Port Authority on the carriers and the
shippers, through a net social benefit formulation. A small-scale case study is presented to demonstrate
the efficiency and the applicability of the proposed methods.
Li and Tayur [44] jointly tackled intermodal service pricing and operations planning within a
medium-term horizon, while satisfying service constraints and maximizing profit. For the pricing part,
unlike the above examples, the authors chose to follow traditional marketing research approaches
to model how the demands change with the prices, based on reservation prices data and probability
density function regression. A mathematical program with a concave objective function is then
considered, for the case of two service classes where the demand is represented in terms of the service
prices. However, a stated limitation of the proposed approach is the complexity to obtain the demand
(and price) function through analytical methods, when the number of customer or product classes
becomes larger. The authors acknowledged the necessity to investigate numerical solution procedures
in that case.
Dandotiya et al. [45] addressed the joint optimization of freight rate and rail-truck terminal
location with the objective of improving the utilization of the railway infrastructure and increasing
the competitiveness of Indian Railways in the logistic sectors. The outcome of the study aims to show
the interrelation between terminal locations and price sensitiveness of customers while meeting the
railway’s profitability targets and without losing traffic to road transport. However, it is not clear how
to interpret the issue of jointly attempting to answer questions that belong to different decision horizons,
as terminal locations are generally regarded as infrastructure and strategic decisions. A mathematical
model is developed with a non-linear shipping cost minimization function, subject to the price
sensitivity of the customer and the profit margin set by the railways. The authors consider a realistic
problem case based on rail-truck intermodal shipment along the Delhi–Mumbai freight corridor.
A joint pricing and design problem was studied by Ypsilantis and Zuidwijk [46] from the
perspective of maritime container terminal operating companies, currently acting as network operators.
The decisions are three-fold: selection of inland terminals to act as extended gates, capacities of the
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corridors and the prices of the transport services over the network. A bilevel programming model
is developed with a profit maximization objective. The model is adapted to multimodal networks
by formulating connection frequency dependent service times and accounting for economies of
scale. The decision of the customers, always provided with an all-road alternative, is anticipated
by minimizing their system costs at the lower level and expressing their expected service level in
the constraints. A heuristic method is designed for a realistic case study and produces near-optimal
solutions in a reasonable time. Some managerial conclusions were drawn by the authors from the
results concerning the service dependencies in the case of the port-to-door and port-to-port services.
2.2.2. Operational Level
Although RM is essentially a legacy from passenger transportation, where it has been used
to allocate capacities and manage trip prices and bookings, it has been increasingly applied in the
freight context as well. At the heart of the growing discussions about the concept of synchromodality
and using the available flexibility to create efficient transportation plans on a multimodal network,
RM has been recently gaining attention and recognition as a promising instrument to help freight and
intermodal carriers to better manage their revenues and price services with respect to the customers’
classes [47,48].
Bilegan et al. [49], proposed a RM policy model from the point of view of a rail freight
transportation company or an intermodal marketing company selling services. The model is designed
to dynamically accept or reject transportation demands in favour of future forecasted demands
with a higher potential profit to maximize the expected revenue of the company. The problem is
tackled at the operational level and said to be inspired by bid-pricing capacity control mechanisms.
The proposed approach is based on a probabilistic mixed integer programming model formulated
on a space-time network representation of the transportation services. The solutions obtained from
numerical simulations show that improved revenues may indeed be attained through the application
of the proposed policies.
Li et al. [50] investigated a cost-plus-pricing strategy to determine the price of intermodal freight
transport services as the sum of the operational cost of the transport operator and the targeted profit
margins under different transport scenarios, i.e., self-transporting, subcontracting, or a combination of
both. An optimal intermodal freight transport planning model is devised at a first stage to minimize
the total transport costs, subject to due time requirements and modality change aspects. Customers are
offered different service packages and final selections are made based on the prices and the shipment
urgency. Based on a case study, simulation results show that higher service prices are observed with
transport demands with larger size or shorter due time.
Liu and Yang [51], studied a joint slot allocation and dynamic pricing strategy problem for a
container sea-rail transport system having demand uncertainties. A two-stage model, based on RM,
is proposed to depict the real-life case of offering both contract and free sale to large and scattered
shippers, respectively. In the first stage, long-term slot, as well as empty container allocation is settled
for the first type of customers with negotiated prices. In the second stage, a multiproduct joint dynamic
pricing and inventory control problem is solved to serve the free sale customers at each period of
the free market, regarding prices as decision variables. Both stochastic models are transformed into
deterministic ones using methods of chance constrained programming and robust optimization.
Van Riessen et al. [47] considered a RM based approach to increase the revenues of carriers
and transportation providers in the context of synchromodal hinterland transportation of maritime
containers. They attempted to overcome the inflexibility of previous transport product structures
by considering each product as a fare class, differing in price and lead time. The approach is in fact
crossing over two decision levels. At the tactical level, it honours long-term agreements by setting
limits for each fare class, considering the available capacity at the operational level. The study aims
to show that a significant revenue increase may be achieved by considering the tactical limits on all
fare classes, as opposed to traditional approaches of limiting only the lower priced class. This work
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is further pursued in [52] by considering a framework to distinguish between different variants of
the Cargo Fare Class Mix problem. The authors demonstrated, within an intermodal case study,
that significant revenue potential can indeed be gained by setting limits on each fare class, thereby
outperforming existing fare class mix policies.
Wang et al. [48] contributed to the field by examining the problem of dynamically allocating the
network capacity of an intermodal barge transportation system. The study builds upon the work in [49]
while adapting it to the studied space-time network and introducing particular accept/reject rules
according to an estimation of the profitability of each new incoming demand. A negotiation process is
proposed, as well as customer classification. The model takes the form of a probabilistic mixed integer
program. Simulations and numerical results show that the introduced RM approach outperforms the
first-come-first-serve booking strategy in terms of generated revenues and demonstrates a positive
behaviour in case of scarce resources.
Wang [53] finally presented in his dissertation a RM approach to dynamically allocate the capacity
of the intermodal barge transport network, where different fare classes are proposed to previously
classified customers to differentiate the transport solutions offered by the carrier taking profitability
into account. The approach is further developed in the context of a scheduled service network design
model, leading to higher profits and better resource utilization. The novelty of this work thus lies in its
application of the RM considerations at both the operational and tactical planning levels. Mixed integer
linear programming (MILP) models are formulated to depict the problem at each level and approximate
solution approaches are proposed.
Table 1 groups the above-mentioned research works in intermodal service pricing and discerns
them in terms of the decision level, decision maker and applied methodology, principally with respect
to the modelling approach.
Table 1. Comparison of intermodal freight service pricing research works.
Study Tactical Operational Decision Maker MethodologyLevel Level
[42] X Intermodal service (rail-truck) provider Market competition modelling
[43] X Port authority, terminal operators Nash equilibrium, bilevel programming
[44] X Intermodal service company Probability distribution,mathematical programming
[45] X Rail freight policy makers Non-linear mathematical programming
[46] X Maritime container terminal operators Bilevel programming
[49] X Rail freight transportation company Probabilistic mixed integer programming
[50] X Intermodal transport operator Cost-plus-pricing,transport planning optimization
[51] X Container sea-rail transport operator Stochastic programming,robust optimization
[47] X X Carriers, intermodal transport providers Markov chain,non-linear mathematical modelling
[52] X X Carriers, intermodal transport providers A framework based on theCargo Fare Class Mix problem
[48] X Intermodal barge transport providers Probabilistic mixed integer programming
[53] X X Intermodal barge transport providers MILP models with RM considerations
Despite acknowledging being still at an early stage, operational approaches for intermodal service
pricing seem to be acquiring increasing interest while relying on already solid RM frameworks from
passenger transport. On the contrary, we observe that research works considering intermodal pricing
adjustments on a medium-term tactical basis are scattered in methodologies and tailored to special
cases, overlooking essential practical aspects especially related to the customers’ reasoning depiction
and demands modelling. This suggests the possibility for intermodal service providers to fall into
sub-optimality, at a time of an already threatened market position for intermodal transport. We see
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the opportunity to define through bilevel programming a framework that is both valid to intermodal
pricing as well as relevant to similar freight service pricing problems. The previous tactical approaches
do not yet offer an OR framework of a generalized perspective to intermodal pricing. Even those that
pointed to bilevel programming in that respect consider it with restrictive assumptions (e.g., in [42],
very limited problem sizes while representing the shippers’ choice by a demand function rather than
a full optimization problem; in [46], limitation on the path structures as each sea container can go at
most through one intermodal service). We aim to discuss potential modelling avenues that allow for
the development of a services’ pricing framework with a wide applicability.
In the following, before moving to elaborate more on the methodology, and its origins in game
theory, within its general frame of applications on multimodal networks and pricing problems, we shed
light on some pricing-related decisions that are relevant to consider as well as the existing link between
optimizing the pricing decisions in the intermodal transport context and enhancing the system’s
performance in terms of sustainability.
2.3. Cost-Related Decisions
There are several crucial cost-related issues to consider while taking service pricing decisions
for intermodal freight transport. It is important to examine the cost structure of the offered services’
level/frequency and its relation to the eventual reliability and flexibility of the transport scheme
according to the target shippers. Despite the increasing contributions along the related research
line combining the revenue aspect of the day-to-day logistics activities with operations planning as
mentioned above, the issues of service design and pricing have been mostly regarded separately in
tactical optimization approaches for intermodal freight transport. In the economic literature, the cost
structure of the transport carriers has been extensively studied in relation to their pricing strategies.
For instance, Combes [54] analysed the complex structure of road freight tariffs within a market
equilibrium model of a carrier-shipper framework. The study underlines the central role of access
costs, vehicle capacity constraints and the logistic costs of shippers in the characteristics of freight tariffs.
However, to our knowledge, few works addressed the simultaneous consideration of the network
design issues and the freight service tariffs to be applied, from a medium-term decision horizon from
an OR perspective. The study in [44] reviewed above addresses the related topics of intermodal service
pricing and operations planning. The latter issue is depicted by service constraints and defining
service classes for the customers. Although it is not necessarily applied to the intermodal transport
context, Brotcorne et al. [55] provided a significant contribution to the subject by presenting a generic
mixed-integer bilevel formulation for the joint design and pricing problem on transport networks,
with an application to the telecommunication industry. The authors considered a profit-maximization
problem at the upper level by simultaneously determining the connections to be opened and the
tariffs assigned to them, whereas, at the lower level, the network users select the shortest paths joining
their origins and destinations. The previously joint pricing and design problem in [46] tackles the
cost-related decisions within a frequency-based model by integrating service capacity constraints and
setting a minimum level of service for the customers.
Nevertheless, more quantitative approaches are needed indeed along this vein of research,
especially with respect to intermodal freight transport and the complex cost structure it subsumes.
2.4. Link between Pricing and Performance in Sustainability
Although the implications of pricing decisions on a certain transport system’s sustainable qualities
do not seem evident, the two issues are strongly correlated with respect to the vital aspect of the
load factor. This is shown in the context of the research project BRAIN-TRansversal Assessment of
Intermodal New Strategies [56], to which this paper’s work belongs. The main goal of the project is to
develop a blue print establishing the detailed criteria and conditions for developing an innovative
international intermodal network in Belgium, as part of the Trans-European Transport Network
(TEN-T) taking rail freight transport as the main interest. It has been underlined through environmental
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assessment that the energy consumption is highly dependent on the load factor; an increase in load
factor should be sought in order to achieve more energy-efficient, hence sustainable, transport systems.
From an operational point of view, in the framework of profit maximization by optimizing on the
services’ prices, it has been noticed that the train load factor has been kept at high levels: 97–99%.
This observation is constant throughout all the conducted experiments for three plausible future
scenarios of costs’ fluctuations. This exhibited property has been explained by the fact that, for a rail
service to be profitable and make up for its high fixed costs, the load factor should not fall below
the above mentioned levels. Therefore, freight consolidation should be sought to fill the containers,
and the experiments conducted on the market formed around the European rail corridors show that
this is indeed a possible endeavour, under a suitable costs and revenues optimization framework.
A high load factor, in that sense, justifies the need to consider pricing decisions as it reflects an efficient
strategy of providing freight carrying services, consequently, an overall enhanced performance of the
transport system in terms of sustainability.
3. Bilevel Optimization
Bilevel optimization problems, introduced by Bracken and McGill [57], give the mathematical
programming formulation of the (static) Stackelberg game-theoretical concept [58]. The problem
involves two sequential layers of players, commonly referred to as: the leader and the follower(s). In the
game, the leader, given a precedence privilege and an ability to anticipate the follower’s decision logic,
plays first and decides on a most advantageous strategy, taking into account the follower’s optimal
reaction to his/her strategy. In more mathematical terms, a subset of the variables of the leader’s
optimization problem is constrained to assume an optimal solution to the follower’s optimization
problem, which is, in turn, parameterized by the remaining variables, however not restrained to the
leader’s constraints. By denoting the leader and follower’s decision vectors, respectively, as x and





subject to G(x, y) ≤ 0 (2)
min
y
f (x, y) (3)
subject to g(x, y) ≤ 0 (4)
where constraints G involve variables from both levels, in contrast to the feasible set defined by X,
and must be indirectly enforced in order to bind the followers. There may be multiple optimal solutions
for the lower level problem for a given set of values for the higher level decision variables. In that sense,
the follower’ s behaviour determines two possible approaches for the leader’ s decision. The first
and most commonly chosen is an optimistic approach that assumes the follower’ s cooperation and
subsequent choice of the most profitable solution to the leader. The second is a pessimistic approach
that assumes the follower’ s aggressive behaviour, leading the leader to bound the damage resulting
from the follower’ s most undesirable reaction.
The bilevel optimization problem was proven to be strongly Non-deterministic Polynomial
(NP)-hard [60]. Later, the results were strengthened to prove that the mere check for local or strict
optimality in the linear case is an NP-hard problem as well [61]. This intrinsic difficulty imposes a
necessity for most classical solution methods to assume certain convenient properties for the functions,
such as smoothness or convexity, to be able to efficiently handle the problem. For a comprehensive
account on the bilevel optimization paradigm, including the mathematical properties, optimality
conditions discussions and solution methods, we refer to [59,62]. A rigorous bibliography review,
containing more than one hundred references, is available as well [63].
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A particular strength of the above mathematical framework is the fact that it takes into account
the strategic behaviour of the target customers through an individual optimization problem, providing
the expected demands with a degree of flexibility and realism that is not affordable through classic
demand functions. The special structure of the problem fits several real-world application domains
having an embedded decision hierarchy within their definition. As a preface to introduce its potential
application to intermodal pricing, we now emphasize on the successful application of the bilevel
optimization concept in transport problems involving modality change, as well as the relevant field of
(network-based) pricing.
3.1. Inter-/Multimodal Transport
In most transport-related decisions, we may observe two autonomous, and possibly conflicting,
levels of decision makers: on the upper level, an authority seeks to meet certain global goals, while, on
the lower level, the network users make their personal travel choices in their best interest. Based on
the surveys in [59,64], the main problem classes of bilevel optimization in the domain of transport
comprise: network design; signal setting; origin-destination (O-D) matrix estimation; hazardous
materials management.
The literature examples in the context of inter-/multimodal transport are of a narrow perspective
though and not significantly numerous. Clegg et al. [65] addressed the problem of optimizing urban
multimodal transport networks in a bilevel manner. The aim is to decide on control values, in terms of
signal green-times and prices, while the travellers’ (rational) route and mode choices, translated into
the estimated traffic flows, are at equilibrium. Yamada et al. [66] proposed a bilevel optimization model
for strategic multimodal network planning. On the upper level, a discrete network design problem
is considered to select a suitable subset of actions from a number of possible ones. The lower level
incorporates a multimodal multiclass UE traffic assignment to capture the decisions’ influence on the traffic
and freight flows. A heuristic approach, based on genetic local search, is applied to solve the problem.
Pazour et al. [67] solved a discrete network design problem. In their problem, the upper-level decision
is where to add high-speed rail arcs, while the lower-level decision is the shortest path problem (for
each O-D) which is affected by the placement of high-speed rail arcs in the network. The objective
of the upper-level decision is to minimize costs by building the fewest high-speed rail arcs, while
the lower-lever decision is to minimize travel time for each O-D by building the most high-speed
arcs. The bilevel program balances the two objectives. Zhang et al. [10] presented an optimization
model for terminal networks, based on bilevel programming, and taking into account environmental
costs and economies of scale. The authors conduct a search among candidate policy packages of
terminal configurations and CO2 emission prices by applying a genetic algorithm, while performing
a multi-commodity flow assignment over a multimodal network to derive the travellers’ decisions.
In the context of energy saving, Du et al. [68] exploited analytical methods, with the aim to bridge
the gap between the designed policy instruments and their corresponding consumption output in the
transport sector. Within a bilevel optimization framework, energy consumption is minimized on the
upper level over a multimodal transport network, subject to the traffic demand distribution, resulting
from a travellers’ utility maximization problem on the lower level.
3.2. Pricing Problems
Bilevel pricing problems, in their economic and OR interpretation, consist of the leader’s problem
of setting taxes or prices for a set of offered services, while accounting for the followers’ choice,
having the freedom to settle for the taxed or the untaxed services, with the aim of minimizing their
own costs. This approach can be regarded as a more rigorous approach in comparison to traditional
demand functions, as the customers’ reaction is depicted by a full optimization problem. The bilevel
framework is suitable for both public and private pricing contexts. It is first introduced in [69], for a
highway-taxation problem. Later, it is developed in [70] for the freight tariff-setting context, adapting
the initial mathematical framework that we discuss below.
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A thorough and important review of this class of bilevel problems is conducted in [71]. The authors
started by presenting a general, as well as a linear version of the price-setting problem. A graphical
interpretation is used to illustrate the conditions under which a bounded solution is guaranteed;
namely, that the follower’s feasible set is both non-empty and bounded, and that there exists at least
a feasible solution for the follower using only untaxed/price-free services. The latter condition is
necessary to prevent the leader of setting an infinite tax/price to their owned services. The scope of
the problem analysis in the survey is further moved to its network-based framework, known as the
network pricing problem (NPP). The leader is an authority owning a subset of arcs and aiming to
maximize his/her revenue through a toll assignment scheme. The followers, in turn, are the users
travelling the network in a cost minimization fashion, from their own perspective. The rest of the
arcs, assumed to be owned by other network agents (or not), are subjected to fixed costs which are
known a priori. Let K be a set of commodities, where each commodity k is associated with an origin
ok, a destination dk and a demand ηk. Let A1 and A2 denote the set of toll arcs and toll free arcs,
respectively, ca a fixed travel cost on each arc a ∈ A1 ∪ A2, and Ta a toll on each toll arc a ∈ A1. If the




























i ∀k ∈ K, ∀i ∈ N (7)
xka, y
k
a ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K, ∀a ∈ K, a ∈ A1 ∪ A2 (8)
where i− and i+ stand for the set of arc with i as head or tail, respectively, and bki evaluates to −1
if i is the origin of commodity k, 1 if it is the destination, and 0 otherwise. Equation (5) gives the
profit-maximization objective of the leader, whereas , Equations (6)–(8) give the followers’ shortest-path
problem. As the bilevel framework dictates, the optimization problem in Equations (6)–(8) appears in
the constraints of the leader’s problem, stating that it must be solved to optimality to obtain a feasible
solution for the whole problem. The lower level has a cost minimization objective (Equation (6)) and is
subject to flow conservation constraints (Equation (7)). When negative tolls are allowed, the model is
said to deal with subsidies. In the same context, two main categories of the problem are introduced:
arc pricing in contrast to path pricing. For the former, the previous formulation typically holds, where the
leader-owned arcs are not restricted to assume similar tolls values. In the latter category, however,
tolls are associated to paths that could be even priced differently for each commodity. The special
case of a polynomial number of paths is also defined; namely, the highway system. Furthermore,
a clear mapping scheme of the special context of product pricing is established with respect to the arc
pricing context, in terms of each pair of corresponding problem elements. The particular strength of
bilevel optimization is evident within this context, where the concept of reservation prices becomes
embedded in the definition of the network itself in the form of the allowed toll windows. The authors
refer to [69] for a two-phase procedure to convert the arc pricing problem into a single-level mixed
integer problem (MIP).
Graph processing techniques have been studied in the literature to reduce the practical size of
the original network. By examining the structural properties associated to the shortest path selected
by each commodity, a shortest path graph can be constructed, where further arcs can be eliminated
using path dominance reasoning. More details on the shortest path graph construction procedure are
furnished by [72,73]. There remains a considerable room for experimentation in the context of the NPP.
Van Hoesel [73] proposed three possible avenues for extension: incorporating capacities on the arcs,
considering other pricing mechanisms and integrating the problem of the network design. Labbé and
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Violin [71], for their part, highlighted a number of open issues, such as integrating real-life features
into bilevel models and tackling more variants of the product pricing problem.
It is noteworthy that bilevel programming equally has a contribution to social welfare applications;
several studies have explicitly treated congestion pricing problems as Stackelberg games on traffic
networks, where the users’ route choice behaviour is described through a network equilibrium
model. Yan and Lam (1996) [74] introduced a two-arc based pricing model that involves queuing
delays. A brief account on the subject of congestion pricing within bilevel programs is given
in [73]. Recently, a multi-objective bilevel pricing model is presented in [75], in the context of
sustainability maximization.
4. Application to Intermodal Pricing
Returning to the context of intermodal freight service pricing, we observe that the economic
interpretation of the addressed carrier-shipper problem fits both the particulars of the product
pricing problem and, by consequence as already settled, the NPP. The intermodal service provider
(carrier) corresponds to a revenue maximizing leader, the set of target customers (shippers) to
utility maximizing or cost minimizing followers, and intermodal tariffs to price decisions, with
a direct parallel of reservation prices and service assignment or arc flow variables. An alternative
would always be available for the shippers, potentially represented in a competition’ s all-road
option. In our methodology proposal, an intermodal carrier has the precedence to make his pricing
decision in the quest of revenues (more understandably profit) maximization, while being able to
anticipate the rational reaction of the target shippers. These latter decision makers typically react in a
cost-minimization fashion to the carrier’s decision, by choosing between the intermodal carrier’s and
the all-road competition’s services. Indeed, the sequential order of the decision-making is akin to the
real-life situation, hence the relevance of the hierarchical bilevel programming structure.
The market is assumed to be composed of small shippers trying to take advantage of freight
consolidation to get their shipments delivered. Furthermore, it is assumed that the intermodal carrier
is not in a monopoly nor in a dominance position of the market; the competition—represented in
all-road transport—is explicitly taken into account in terms of its supply and tariff. In that respect,
it is presumed that the total demand is not influenced by the intermodal carrier’s price and that the
competition does not react in the short term to the carrier’s decisions. Nevertheless, for simplification
purposes, it is assumed that the carrier is in full control of the intermodal resources. To represent
an oligopolistic market with reactive competition at the intermodal carrier’s (upper) level is both
mathematically difficult to address and beyond the scope of this paper.
We dedicate the next sub-sections to presenting some modelling insights related to expressing
the particulars of intermodal service pricing within a bilevel program. We further discuss the
representation of the underlying multimodal network, the possible developments of the upper-level
optimization problem, and the portrayal of the shippers/followers’ lower-level problem in terms of
two viewpoints: freight mode choice and traffic assignment.
4.1. Network Representation
Normally, each modal network (e.g., road or rail) is represented separately. To depict multimodal
networks, the idea, initially proposed in [76], is to use pseudo or virtual links to represent intermodal
transfers among the modal networks. To our knowledge, one of the first software tools that allowed a
graphical analysis of multimodal transport networks is STAN (Strategic Transport ANalysis) ([77]).
As different transport operations can occur on the same infrastructure, a virtual link with a specific
cost is created for each particular operation. A further development of this concept is implemented
in an assignment model and software, NODUS [78,79]. The main contribution is the development
of a structured notation and automatic generation of the virtual links created on the basis of the
characteristics of the geographical nodes and links. Through the creation of virtual links, all feasible
operations such as loading, unloading or transhipment are represented and their costs can be taken
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into account. In the same way, all kinds of vehicles using the same geographical infrastructure can be
characterized and all possible combinations of modes and means can be examined. We refer to [80]
for a review of the European literature on freight transport models. This approach is now commonly
known as Virtual Networks or Supernetworks. The obtained network may then be used for traditional
cost calculations.
4.2. Upper-Level Problem—Carrier’s Decisions
At the upper level, the trivial case would be to consider a maximization problem of the intermodal
carrier’s (leader’s) revenues, collected through the chosen service charges, and consequently achieve
high load factors. An obvious upper bound to the total revenues would be given by the difference
between the service prices charged by the competition and any service unit traversal costs borne by
the shippers, as explained in [70] for the general context of bilevel freight tariff-setting problems.
4.2.1. Service Design
As a transport service provider seeks to attract more customers, it is reasonable to assume that he
tries to enhance the offered service quality which presumably comes at an additional cost. Striking the
balance between efficiency and competitiveness is the ultimate goal of pricing problems. Therefore,
it is logical to consider the questions of service design and pricing in a simultaneous manner. This is
particularly valid in the intermodal transport context, where devising prices largely depends on
the costs of transport services in each modal sector along the door-to-door chain. In that broader
sense, the leader’s objective becomes the maximization of the profit, represented in the difference
between the collected revenues and the service operating costs. The service design decisions are
typically represented as their respective frequencies, with a crucial link of the issues of flexibility
and reliability at the shippers’ side. At a more operational level, the service dispatch day could
equally be portrayed alongside the frequency. A usually problematic issue in this type of problems
from a bilevel programming point of view is the introduction of additional design variables (e.g.,
service frequencies, demands routing). These (upper-level) variables normally appear combined with
the (lower-level) service choice or flow variables to enforce service level-related as well as capacity
constraints. The position of similar joint constraints in the bilevel program dictates the problem’s
feasible and optimal set of solutions. We refer to [55,81] for a thorough discussion of the conditions
under which the movement of the joint constraints between the levels can be performed.
4.2.2. Asset Management
Moreover, it is valid to account for resource-balancing and asset management constraints.
This is especially relevant for long-distance transport scheme as in intermodal transport and
consolidation-based freight carriers. The resources requiring efficient allocation and utilization can
potentially comprise vehicles, equipment, power units and staff. This aspect, of course, suggests
additional burden on the incurred costs for the intermodel carriers as well as on the mathematical
complexity side. The formulations must then be enlarged with further variables and constraints to
represent the new design-balance requirements. A comparative analysis of different formulations
addressing asset management issues in a service network design context is presented in [82].
4.2.3. Economies of Scale
The upper-level objective can be further developed by considering a marginal cost decrease
induced by the potential generation of economies of scale; a strength related to intermodal transport
and the integration of modes having higher payloads. With proper consolidation, transport operators
can likely apply more efficient strategies to offer services, and consequently improve the overall
energy consumption of their system and its performance in terms of sustainability. This concept was
previously in part incorporated in a joint design and pricing framework in [46,83].
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4.3. Followers’ Freight Mode Choice Problem
The idea is to render the shippers’ lower level problem a freight mode choice problem. The general
behavioural assumption is that shippers seek to minimize their total logistics costs. There is a
sufficiently wide literature that considers a corresponding functional representation that goes beyond
a linear utility function of modal attributes. Several individual items interact in complex ways to
determine the total logistics costs, involving commodities’, shippers’ and shipments’ characteristics,
in relation to level-of-service and mode attributes. The most notable research works related to the
topic of logistics costs is found in [84,85]. The generally acknowledged structure comprise: direct
shipping cost, in-transit carrying, ordering cost and inventory carrying cost. Some service-related
attributes may equally be added to account for intangible elements, e.g., satisfaction with contract
terms and availability of electronic data interchange services [86]. Nevertheless, an application of a
normative approach provided by cost models repetitively fails to coincide with the shippers’ actual
choices. This is chiefly due to two reasons: the non-uniformity of the service perception among the
shippers; and the lack of certain significant information for the cost calculation (e.g., discount rate,
cost per order and the number of days to collect a loss and damage claim). The alternative, as explained
in [86,87], is to combine discrete choice methods with the minimization of total logistics costs, in the
same way that utility maximization is modelled for individuals’ choice behaviour in passenger traffic
in [88]. The shippers’ modal selection can be specified in quantitative terms by employing a random
utility model, where the choice model estimation is in fact an estimation of the missing cost variables
information, together with the importance of the different cost components. The utility of a certain
mode i for shipper n is expressed as: µ(logistics costsin) + εin, where µ is a negative scale parameter,
logistics costsin depicts the explanatory variables of the model and εin an unobservable or random
component [87]. Therefore, the event of choosing a certain alternative is considered stochastic with a
choice probability depending on the distributional assumption of the disturbance term in the utility
function. The Logit and the Probit models are the most commonly acknowledged. Based on a proper
pool of data, a final shippers’ utility can be estimated and integrated in the reaction of the followers
within the bilevel intermodal pricing model.
4.4. Followers’ Traffic Assignment Problem
Another alternative is to consider the shippers’ problem from a route/path choice viewpoint.
This case is particularly valid when the carrier do not provide the shippers with a total itinerary choice,
rather with separate services’ options—presumably that of the long haul—and the decision that is
relative to combining those services, with possibly that of the competition, takes place on the shippers’
end to satisfy the demands. Note that the network is fully connected in terms of road: the competition’s
continuous presence. This is a relevant case when freight forwarders act as an intermediate layer
between the carriers and the shippers. An example of such a case is discussed in [70] in the context of
a freight tariff setting problem, where the shippers’ decision is reduced to a shortest-path assignment.
As these decisions take place on the lower level, for simplification purposes, we do not differentiate
between freight forwarders and shippers.
Traditionally, the lower level problem in the variants of the NPP problem, presented in Section 3,
is handled as a shortest path problem, where the arc capacities are ignored (or assumed unconstrained)
and the arc travel times, reflected in their respective costs, are regarded as constants. However, in more
realistic cases, where the effects of congestion are to be taken into account, there exists a mutual
dependence between the arc flows and costs. In that sense, the link flows and costs are iteratively
updated, moving towards a state of equilibrium. Two main modelling branches accordingly stem from
this distinction: shortest path and traffic equilibrium assignment models.
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4.4.1. Shortest Path Assignment
In a shortest path assignment, more formally known as all-or-nothing (AON) assignment, all the
trips from a certain origin to a destination zone are assigned to a single shortest (minimum cost) path
among all feasible ones, assuming no congestion effects, hence constant link costs, and a unified costs
perception for all drivers [89]. A typical formulation for such a case in a multi-commodity network is
given by the problems in Equations (6)–(8). Although it seems unrealistic in terms of selecting only
one path for each O-D pair and ignoring real-life aspects, it may be reasonable in sparse networks,
where there are few alternative routes widely differing in cost, and in order to provide an insight on
the desired path in the absence of congestion. Models, using the AON technique, mostly make similar
assumptions and run necessary experiments in order to alleviate the effect of capacity shortage on
their concerned decision horizon.
4.4.2. Traffic Equilibrium Assignment
The issue of congestion is explicitly considered by expressing a link cost as function of its usage
level, with respect to its capacity. As the flow increases towards the capacity of a certain network
link, it is conceivable that the traffic conditions deteriorate and the link speed becomes lower, which
implies a higher travel time and cost, diverting in turn part of the flow to alternative, now, cheaper
links. A number of such iterative procedures would take place until the fluctuation in links costs and
flows would eventually converge, reaching an equilibrium configuration that can be regarded either
from the user or the system perspective. Typical non-cooperative models are based on the first case,
known as Wardrop’s first principle of traffic equilibrium [90], stating that the journey times on all the
routes used are equal, and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route.
A UE is thus attained when no driver can unilaterally reduce his/her travel costs by shifting to another route.
We refer to [91] for a rigorous treatment of the network equilibrium problem, as well as to [92] for a
thorough account on congestion issues in the frame of bilevel network design problems.
Let G = (A, N) denote an underlying network, with N representing a set of nodes, A a set of
links, and K a set of O-D pairs. If we define for each kth pair in K a set of simple paths between its end
nodes as Pk, the travel demand as ηk, the shortest route travel time as pik, and the travel time and flow
on the pth route in Pk as cpk and hpk, respectively. Therefore, the UE principle can be mathematically
expressed through the following conditions [64]:
hpk(cpk − pipk) = 0 ∀p ∈ Pk, (9)
cpk − pipk ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pk, (10)
∑
p∈Pk
hpk = ηki , (11)
hpk ≥ 0 ∀p ∈ Pk, (12)
for every O-D pair k.
According to Migdalas [64], there exist two main modeling approaches for the UE problem:
a non-linear network model and a Variational Inequality (VI) formulation. In the first approach,
for every link a ∈ A, a travel cost function sa(xa) is defined in terms of its total flow xa, as encountered
by a user traveling on link a. A convex optimization problem can thus be formulated, for which,
the conditions in Equations (9)–(12) hold as the first-order optimality conditions, assuming sa to
be positive, strictly monotone increasing and continuously differentiable. In the second approach,
however, the general case where the link travel functions may also depend on the flow of neighbouring
links is considered. Assuming similar properties on the link travel and the route cost function,
the equilibrium problem can be formulated as VIs, in which case, the resulting bilevel program can be
regarded as an equivalent to a mathematical program with equilibrium constraint (MPEC). As shown
in [59], MPECs incorporate bilevel programs, whenever the lower level problem in the latter is convex
and differentiable. The reverse holds as well through replacing the lower-level VI by an optimization
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problem. To our knowledge, the literature is nearly silent on examples incorporating a network
equilibrium problem in the lower-level of a NPP, in the profit maximizing sense of the problem.
It may be argued, however, about the irrelevance of (endogenous) congestion in intermodal
planning, relying on the points that pricing decisions are generally regarded for a larger interval than
that of the congestion occurrence and that intermodal freight operations are typically intended to
take place at low-congested times. To the first, we reply that, if the network in question experiences
congestion in quite a regular manner within the decision horizon, for sufficiently long periods, taking
congestion into consideration would therefore be justifiable. To the second, we point to the current
state of terminal sites, or areas adjacent to the terminals, being greatly implicated by the traffic
concentration that intermodal hub networks commonly generate in terms of noise, accidents and
congestion. A contribution to the debate on how to render terminals more coping with the traffic
growth can be found in [93].
The above equilibrium approaches have been developed to capture freight movement through
the concept of spatial price equilibrium (SPE). SPE denotes that, in the case of a trade occurrence
between a pair of markets, the price of a commodity at the demand market is equal to its price at the
supply market plus the transport cost. The demand price is exceeded if there is no trade. The original
problem dates to [94] and is proven to assume a similar structure to certain cases of the traffic network
equilibrium problem in [95]. Harker [96] discussed the applicability of equilibrium models to the
freight context and Lee et al. [97] give an example of a bilevel shipper-carrier model focusing on the
shippers’ behaviour employing SPE.
5. Conclusions
This research was motivated by the rising need to mitigate traffic flows from the road transport
networks. In this context, pricing is identified as a powerful instrument to improve intermodality’s
share, attain more balanced modal splits and, consequently, reduce environmental impacts. We provide
through this paper a comprehensive and wide-scale review of the pricing subject in the OR literature
of intermodal freight transport. First, the problem is described and previous contributions are outlined,
in terms of their extension of classic concepts to account for the dynamics and interaction of the
different transport modes. Through our investigation, we demonstrate the scarcity, as well as the
narrowness, of the previous research in its discussion of intermodal freight carriers’ pricing decisions
at a tactical level, overlooking important modelling issues. As a result, we conclude a significant
deficiency in attaining high load factors, and, consequently, less sustainable and energy-efficient freight
transport systems.
Second, an approach is proposed to express this problem as a bilevel program: a well-suited
framework for similar hierarchical pricing schemes, with a potentially large room for investigation
for the considered application. The compatible features of bilevel optimization are reviewed and
modelling insights as to how to express the pricing problem of concern in the suggested form are
provided. More precisely, a certain intermodal operator (a leader) has the precedence of setting the
prices of his/her offered freight services in the quest of profit maximization, while being able to fully
anticipate the shippers’ (followers) rational reactions to the chosen pricing decisions when presented
with a trucking alternative.
Finally, a special discussion is devoted to the multimodal network representation via the concept
of virtual networks, as well as possible outlooks with respect to the shippers’ behaviour depiction at
the lower-level, namely: freight mode choice and traffic network assignment.
In the context of future outlooks, the intermodal transport context suggests interesting research
extensions for the problem that deserve in-depth consideration, e.g., integrating service design
questions to model the interaction between the different modes, as well as the potential generation
of economies of scale with higher payloads reflected in a marginal cost decrease. Indeed, the latter
aspect is of a high relevance to optimize the system’s performance in terms of sustainability and energy
consumption: a serious need for our current day’s societies.
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